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Contrarian methods can be risky and when investing in companies that are doing poorly, there is 
always a chance of declaring bankruptcy. Andrew Bary [2013] wrote an article in the Wall Street 
journal called "Betting on 2012's S&P 500 losers". This article stated the S&P 500 top decliners 
did better than the S&P 500 for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. He was interested in seeing if 
this trend would continue for the 2012's losers. He specifically looked at the returns for the first 
two weeks of the next year for these losers.  Is it true that these top 10 decliners, or losers, 
outperformed the S&P 500, and if so is betting on the losers safe? It was observed on average 
that the losers from 2011 had an increase in returns of 17.4% where the S&P 500 only saw a 
return of 2.5%. This happens either because of late year selling for tax reasons, or institutional 
investors may not want to hold these companies as they might embarrass them in front of clients. 
We statistically explored if these differences were due to a random coincidence or if they 
actually statistically outperform the S&P 500.  We not only looked at the losers from the 
previous 3 years that Bary claimed this to be true, but also looked at losers from years 2000 
through 2008 along with 2012. We also explored different investment horizons other than two 
weeks.  
 
In the past, a few economists have looked at the contrarian method of investing in losers. De 
Bondt and Thaler have explored many aspects of the losers but have never compared them back 
to the overall S&P 500. In their first paper, De Bondt and Thaler [1985] assessed the question, 
does the stock market over react? In this paper they looked at January returns for not only losers 
but winners as well. They found that excess returns can be found in January for as much as 5 
years later. They saw much larger excess returns in losers than winners. In a follow-up paper, De 
Bondt and Thaler [1986] touched on the topic again while also looking at stock market 
seasonality. In their follow-up study they searched for a correlation between the losers and 
excess returns for different time periods. They again found that there were more excess returns 
for the losers and much higher returns in the month of January. In months February through 
September, they saw lower yet positive returns, but saw negative returns from October to 
December.  A De Bondt and Thaler [1989] later paper assessed the risk of the winner and loser 
companies. Because winners have a higher risk with more downside, companies offer risk 
premiums which drops stock prices. When information comes in, investors discover their fear of 
a decrease in stock performance was not as severe as anticipated, which drives prices up. The 
market overreaction drives prices high but risk premiums bring prices down, balancing each 
other out. With the losers, they found a price reversal or an increase in losers stock returns. They 
also found that a portfolio of smaller loser companies may be riskier than just one large loser 
company.  
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In early 2000, De Bondt worked with Chen [2004] and looked at winners and losers performance 
for 3, 6, 9, and 12 month periods. They categorized these stocks into different sizes. They look at 
stocks most successful arbitrage strategies for the last 12 months and holds for 3, 6, 9, and 12 
months. They also looked at different market styles by looking how these losers and winners did 
after bull, normal, and bear markets. Wongchoti and Pyun [2005] followed up this study with 
assessing risk in this contrarian method by evaluating non S&P 500 NYSE stocks. They found 
that the lower volume and medium volume stocks had higher risk and on average didn't see 
excess returns for the next year, but they did see excess returns for larger companies. They 
looked at winner, loser, and contrarian portfolios.  
 
Taking what these economists did, we looked at just the losers. We want see if the losers do 
outperform the S&P 500. Since it was only companies in the S&P 500, we could say that these 
stocks were fairly high volume and less risky than smaller companies. Our main interest was to 
identify whether or not the top ten decliners in the S&P 500 for a given year, outperformed the 
S&P 500 for the specified horizon level of the next year. We assessed the years from 2000 on 
and looked at four different investment horizon levels.  
 
Data Collection:  
Obtained in this research project was a constituents list that contained all companies that have 
ever been in the S&P 500. From this list a table was modified into four columns: company, 
ticker, year entered the S&P 500, year exited S&P 500. This table was then expanded into a 
larger table that listed all companies in the S&P 500 for each year. With this table, the adjusted 
closing cost were read in from Yahoo finance[2013]. The adjusted closing costs were read from 
the close of the previous year and the close for end of the given year. These adjusted closing 
costs were used to find the continuously compounded returns for the given year. Once the 
continuously compounded returns were obtained for each company and year, we could then find 
the top 10 decliners or losers for each year. 
 
Once the list of losers was obtained for years 2000 to 2012, we could test to see if the S&P 500 
losers outperformed the S&P 500.We did so by finding the losers returns for the specified 
investment horizon level for each year. Also in this table of losers and their returns, we found the 
S&P 500 continuously compounded returns for the given year and investment horizon. The 
difference was then taken between the losers and the S&P 500 for the given year and investment 
horizon. A visual representation of this is showed in exhibits 1 and 2. 
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Exhibit 1 :2000 Losers  Exhibit 2: 2001 Losers Returns 
Year Ticker Returns  Year Ticker Losers S&P 500 Difference 
2001 YHOO -1.9737  2001 YHOO -0.0934 0.0048 -0.0982 
2001 CPWR -1.7853  2001 CPWR 0.5424 0.0048 0.5375 
2001 BMC -1.7422  2001 BMC 0.6475 0.0048 0.6427 
2001 SXCL -1.5822  2001 SXCL 0.1934 0.0048 0.1885 
2001 XRX -1.554  2001 XRX 0.4667 0.0048 0.4618 
2001 CA -1.2743  2001 CA 0.3435 0.0048 0.3387 
2001 AAPL -1.2401  2001 AAPL 0.1407 0.0048 0.1359 
2001 S -1.1828  2001 S 0.2752 0.0048 0.2704 
2001 CTXS -1.0055  2001 CTXS 0.2029 0.0048 0.1980 
2001 MSFT -0.9903  2001 MSFT 0.1920 0.0048 0.1872 
 
 
The article stated that the first two weeks saw losers outperforming the S&P 500, and some of 
these losers good performances could be traced up until the end of the next year. Therefore four 
different investment horizons were explored in this paper: two weeks, one month, one quarter, 
one year.  
 
In exhibit 3, we can see that Bary’s observation of the last three years for the two week 
investment horizon did see a higher return for the average losers than the S&P 500. However, 
this may not be a safe bet. In 2004, 2005, and 2008 the losers appeared to underperform the S&P 
500. Some years have very similar returns as well. A statistical one sample t-test on these 
differences is needed before making the conclusion that the losers outperformed the S&P 500.   
 
When looking at each graph for the different investment horizons, it is clear that the larger the 
investment horizon, the more variability is visible in the losers. This is to be expected as the 
losers for a year later would be somewhat independent and we would expect some losers to 
rebound, while others maintain their poor performance. It also appears that the mean of the losers 
diverges from the S&P 500. 
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Statistical Testing: 
The appropriate analysis on these losers would be a one-sample t-test on the differences between 
the losers and the S&P 500. The null hypothesis is there is no difference between the losers and 
the S&P 500. The alternative hypothesis or what we are trying to prove is that the differences 
between the losers and S&P 500 is greater than zero, or that the losers returns are greater than the 
S&P 500 returns. A 1-sample t-test was run for each investment horizon and each year. In exhibit 
4 there is a p-value for each year at each investment horizon level. A 95% confidence interval of 
the differences was attached if the p-value was significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
1-sample t-test on adjusted cumulative returns 
D = Loser Returns – S&P 500 Returns 
Ho : µD = 0 
H1 : µD > 0 
µD : Population mean difference between loser  
and S&P 500 returns for specified horizon 
 
From the inference table in exhibit 4, there are only four out of the twelve years when the S&P 
500 losers statistically outperformed the S&P 500 for a two week investment horizon. It appears 
that as the investment period gets larger, there are statistically less significant years where the 
losers outperformed the S&P 500. There also seems to be a pattern that the years the losers 
outperform the S&P 500 for the two week investment horizon, the losers tend to outperform for 
one month and one quarter later.  This is somewhat expected as these stocks get off to great starts 
so we would expect the losers to maintain their good performance. In years 2001 and 2003 the 
losers were still outperforming the S&P 500 a whole year later. Now because only 25% of the 
years showed significant evidence of losers outperforming the S&P 500, it would not seem like 
the losers were worth betting on. There appears to be a trend that after bad economic years (2001 
and 2008), the losers for the next year didn’t do as poorly and outperformed the S&P 500. For 
example, the losers for 2002 outperformed the S&P 500 a year after the downturn in 2001. The 
same trend appears for 2009 losers, they experienced better returns than the S&P a year after 
2008. Both times when the economy took a downturn, these losers saw higher returns.  
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Exhibit 4: Inference Results 
  Investment Horizon 
  
 First 2 Weeks First Month First Quarter Year 
Y
ea
r 
2001 0.0012 (0.1315, 0.4411) 
0.0001 
(0.2864, 0.5561) 
0.0202 
(0.0143, 0.5049) 
0.0032 
(0.1617, 0.7342) 
2002 0.1497 0.7829 0.9933 0.9968 
2003 0.0107 (0.0171, 0.1671) 0.3663 0.7508 
0.0005 
(0.3060, 0.8609) 
2004 0.9887 0.4947 0.3569 0.209 
2005 0.9956 0.9856 0.9793 0.9775 
2006 0.0819 0.076 0.4158 0.6163 
2007 0.2184 0.2062 0.7562 0.9391 
2008 0.9998 0.3265 0.8456 0.9905 
2009 0.2841 0.8665 0.6516 0.0716 
2010 0.0043 (0.0327, 0.1697) 
0.0054 
(0.0544, 0.3163) 
0.0036 
(0.0715, 0.3420) 0.1044 
2011 0.4068 0.3729 0.1016 0.7559 
2012 0.0018 (0.0423, 0.1591) 
0.0077 
(0.0349, 0.2535) 
0.0429 
(-0.0296, 0.3722) 0.0662 
2013 0.3217 0.1175 0.5376 
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Conclusion: 
 
Bary stated in the beginning of the article that the losers did exceptionally well and that the 
average returns of the losers was higher than the S&P 500. Exhibit 4 shows that the losers did 
not consistently outperformed the S&P 500 for the years 2000 on. Looking at 2012's losers, it is 
apparent that the losers did not statistically outperform the S&P S&P 500in 2013 and his 
statement would not have been statistically correct for the losers. A contrarian might want to 
explore different investment horizons with different amounts of companies classified as S&P 500 
losers. It was visible that the larger the investment horizon, the less likely the difference was to 
be statistically significant. Seeing this trend, a contrarian may want to explore an investment 
horizon less than two weeks, specifically between one and ten days. While there are many 
theories why the losers outperform or are close to outperforming the S&P 500, it appears that it 
might just be a short rebound. It would be interesting to see if the S&P 500 winners maintain 
their great performance or if they tend to drop as well.  
9 
 
References: 
 
Bary, Andrew. "Betting on 2012's S&P 500 Losers A Technical View | The Smarter Investor." 
Wall Street Journal. N.p., n.d. Web. 6 Jan. 2013. 
 
Chen, Hsiu-Lang., De Bondt, Werner. "Style Momentum within the S&P-500 Index." Journal of 
Empirical Finance 11.4 (2004), pp. 483-507.  
 
De Bondt, Werner F. M., and Thaler, Richard H. "Does the Stock Market Overreact?" The 
Journal of Finance, 40.3 (1985), pp. 793-805. 
 
De Bondt, Werner F. M., and Thaler, Richard H. “Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction 
and Stock Market Seasonality.” The Journal of Finance, 42.3 (1986), pp. 557-581. 
 
De Bondt, Werner F. M., and Thaler, Richard H. "Anomalies: A Mean-Reverting Walk Down 
Wall Street." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3.1 (1989), pp. 189-202. 
 
Wongchoti, Udomsak. Pyun, Chong Soo. "Risk-Adjusted Long-Term Contrarian Profits: 
Evidence from Non-S&P 500 High-Volume Stocks." The Financial Review, 40.3 (2005): 
335-59. 
 
"Yahoo! Finance - Business Finance, Stock Market, Quotes, News." Yahoo! Finance. N.p., n.d. 
Web. Spring 2013. 
 
